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Štefan Riegelnik
Slices of meaning: Levels of analysis and 
the unity of understanding
Abstract: Although there is little agreement about where the demarcation line 
between semantics and pragmatics lies, there is strong consensus that those who 
ignore or deny the distinction are on a wrong track. In this paper I do not want 
to provide a further suggestion on how to make the distinction. Instead, I want 
to raise a problem for any theory of language based on a distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics. I argue that the idea of decomposing an utterance 
into a semantic and a pragmatic part precludes an account of the unity an utter-
ance exhibits. For this reason, I conclude that approaches towards a theory of 
language based on a distinction between semantics and pragmatics should be 
reconsidered.
1 Introduction
Philosophers and linguists of many persuasions appeal to the distinction 
between semantics and pragmatics. Their motives for introducing the distinc-
tion are legion (Morris 1938, Austin 1962, Levinson 1983, Stalnaker 1970, Grice 
1989, Bach 2004) and so are the views on its nature. Broadly speaking, and from 
an uncritical perspective, the distinction is a way to differentiate elements and 
effects as constituents of an arbitrary utterance. I assume that an utterance is the 
primary unit of meaning and that meaning and interpretation are deeply linked.1 
Granting these assumptions, the distinction between semantics and pragmat-
ics might be understood as a way to decompose natural language utterances. By 
way of an example, imagine the utterance of “This is Ginger” where the speaker 
points to a specific person standing in the corner. With the help of the gesture an 
interpreter is able to recognise what the speaker intends to say by using the words 
“This”, “is” and “Ginger” and the pointing at the specific person. Decomposing 
the utterance into the words chosen by the speaker and the speaker’s gesture, 
the study of the meaning of the words, or their literal meaning, or what Grice 
identifies as the conventional meaning (Grice 1988: 25) falls within the scope of 
1 Some readers might find this counterintuitive; to belie these worries, see Davidson 1967 and 
1970.
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semantics. All further factors pertaining to the utterance, such as the gesture, 
belong to the study of pragmatics. The former is often considered to be the study 
of the context-invariant meaning; the latter is often considered to be the study 
of what is conveyed in a particular context. But wherever one draws the line 
between semantics and pragmatics, it appears to be plausible to understand the 
interpretation of the utterance as an interplay between elements and effects per-
taining to both realms. For imagine the situation without the speaker’s gesture: 
then the interpreter might have taken the speaker to say something quite differ-
ently. For example, the speaker might be pointing out that the odd flavour of the 
wine is caused by ginger. Or, imagine that the speaker uses different words, say, 
“I”, “am” and “Ginger”.
In this paper I am not concerned with the question of where philosophers 
and linguists should draw a line between semantics and pragmatics. Instead, 
I want to concentrate on the question of how these elements and effects are to 
be related so that an utterance emerges. For my purpose it is thus of secondary 
importance where or how the line is drawn, as long as there is a one. I am consid-
ering any theory of interpretation that asserts a semantics‐pragmatics distinction 
regardless of how it further articulates that distinction. Then, by assumption, any 
of these theories must provide some account of how pragmatic and semantic ele-
ments within a given utterance come together so that a unified whole emerges. 
Because it is in virtue of this unity that an utterance could be judged to be 
either true or false, or, appropriate or inappropriate. Consider again the “This is 
Ginger”-utterance: Both the gesture and the words are supposed to belong to the 
utterance and both are relevant for its interpretation. If so, then merely listing the 
constituting parts will not suffice to explain the interplay between semantics and 
pragmatics. For what needs to be accounted for is the unity the “This-is-Ginger”-
utterance exhibits.
In what follows, I argue that it is precisely the requirement for the unity of 
an utterance that represents a stumbling block for theorists building frameworks 
predicated on the semantic-pragmatic distinction. In the context of the debate 
about the unity the way an utterance gets decomposed is of crucial importance. 
Thus even if one assumes that one can safely ignore the unity problem when it 
arises in the context of the debate about the semantics-pragmatics distinction, 
one can insist that the decomposition of an utterance results in elements which 
could be reunified in principle. This I take it to be a minimal condition for any 
theory of meaning.2 For, prima facie, if this condition is not met, one does not 
2 I follow the truism that to understand an utterance is to know what it means. Thence a theory 
of meaning is on a par with a theory of interpretation.
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know how linguistic decomposition relates to the utterance. As I argue, the idea 
of dividing an utterance into a semantic part and a pragmatic part conflicts with 
the minimal condition.3
The structure of my paper is as follows: In the subsequent section, I discuss 
the idea and some of the motives behind the distinction of the semantics and 
the pragmatics of an utterance. In section 3, I formulate by means of Russell’s 
analysis of propositions the problem of the unity of the utterance. As a point of 
reference, in section 4 I discuss briefly Davidson’s solution to this problem and 
his understanding of the semantics of a declarative sentence. In the last sections 
I focus on so-called near-side pragmatic effects in their alleged function to co-
determine the truth conditions of an utterance. I take near-side pragmatic effects 
as an example because they display the required unity clearly. However, I think 
the scope of the problem is greater than the examples I discuss. In conclude that 
theories based on a distinction between semantics and pragmatics face a fatal 
problem when it comes to explaining the unity of an utterance.
2 In slices – ways to decompose an utterance
Ever since the publication of Charles Morris’ Foundations of a Theory of Signs 
(1938) and the introduction of the trichotomy between syntax, semantics and 
pragmatics, philosophers of language and linguists have quarreled over the ques-
tion of where to draw a line between these three realms. Traditionally, syntax and 
semantics deal with the context-invariant aspects of an utterance and pragmat-
ics deals with the context-dependent ones. Accordingly, various utterances of the 
sentence-type “This is Ginger” share as the context-invariant part the sentence, 
irrespective of what the demonstrative “this” refers to. However, drawing the 
line in this way is now considered to be inadequate – for it is too simplistic (cf. 
Stanley 2007: 32). In the wake of H.P. Grice’s distinction between what is said and 
what is implicated by an utterance, the debate on what pertains to semantics and 
what to pragmatics has received a considerable boost.4 Attempting to develop a 
more sophisticated theory, Grice divides the interpretation of an utterances into 
two phases. The first one deals with truth conditions of an uttered sentence and 
results in what is said (Grice 1989: 25). This phase rests heavily on conventionally 
3 See Hylton (1984) and Gaskin (2008) who stress the relevance of the problem of the unity.
4 Grice did not make use of the expressions “semantics” and “pragmatics”. He pointed out that 
his use of “say” and “what is said” or “implicate” or “what is implicated” deviate from ordinary 
usage (Grice 1988: 25).
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encoded sentence or word meaning and includes the assignment of denotations of 
the words (including indexical expressions) and their combination. The second 
phase takes as input that what is said and deals with everything else that is con-
veyed with an utterance. It runs along general conversational principles which 
enable the interpreter to infer what the speaker implicates.
Although there is consensus that Grice’s model needs to be refined in several 
respects, his model still plays an important role in contemporary debates on the 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Most notably, contextualists of 
various manifestations argue that what is said with an utterance is influenced 
to a far larger extent by near-side pragmatic effects than Grice allows (Recanati 
2001, 2004, 2010; Stanley 2007; Cappelen/Lepore 2005).
Accordingly, contemporary contextualists’ theories of interpretation can 
be grouped by the degree of impact of pragmatic effects on truth conditions, 
i.e. by the number of assumed context-sensitive expressions.
In contrast to the wide ranging and acrimonious discussions on the nature of 
the distinction, skeptical doubts concerning the viability of a distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics have been mostly neglected.5 The fundamental ques-
tions to be addressed are: Are natural languages suitable for such a distinction 
at all? Is it possible to draw a sharp line? Would it be better if philosophers and 
linguists gave up the quest for a demarcation line altogether?
Kent Bach is among those philosophers and linguists for whom the answer to 
the first two questions is clearly “yes”. According to him, the reason for introduc-
ing the distinction is “to provide a framework for explaining the variety of ways in 
which what a speaker conveys can fail to be fully determined by the (conventional) 
linguistic meaning of the sentence he utters” (Bach 1999: 66). Bach cites indexi-
cality, ambiguity, vagueness, semantic underdetermination, implicitness, implica-
ture, and non-truth-conditional content as linguistic phenomena that require the 
introduction of a framework with different levels or slices. The framework he has 
in mind is supposed to cover the differences in the explanatory functions. Con-
sider again an utterance of “This is Ginger”.6 Understanding the word meaning 
of “This”, “is”, and “Ginger” – usually considered to be the semantic part of an 
utterance and determined conventionally – would not suffice to understand what 
a speaker conveys by this utterance. Even if one consulted a myriad of dictionar-
ies, one would not find an answer to the question of what the demonstrative “this” 
5 A dissenting voice is Cappelen (2007).
6 In what follows, I focus on the demonstrative “this”, but the same line of reasoning would 
apply to other expressions taken to be context-sensitive.
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 11.12.17 10:37
 Slices of meaning: Levels of analysis and the unity of understanding   217
used as part of a particular utterance refers to. So it appears to be the defining 
feature of utterances in which “this” is used that their meaning is different from 
context to context. This would make it plausible to think of the context of an utter-
ance as what one ought to consider in order to understand an utterance contain-
ing “this”. To be more precise, since the reference of the word “this” vary with the 
context, it seems to be plausible to say that the truth conditions are co-determined 
by the context. Thus the appeal to the context of an utterance looks not only to be 
innocuous, but positively necessary in order to determine the meaning of an utter-
ance of a sentence containing an indexical expression or a demonstrative.
In contemporary debates on the role of an utterance’s context, minimalists 
(Cappelen/Lepore 2005, Borg 2004) claim that, basically, near-side pragmatic 
effects with regard to indexical expressions and demonstratives are relevant 
in order to determine what is semantically expressed. Moderate contextualists 
(Stanley 2007) agree with minimalists about this, but they also think that the class 
of expressions which are context-sensitive needs to be extended. Thus minimalists 
seek to confine near-side pragmatic effects to a very small class of expressions, 
whereas moderate contextualists are open to extending the class of context- 
sensitive expression. In contrast to the two aforementioned positions, radical 
contextualists (Recanati 2004, 2010, Bezuidenhout 2002) claim that near-side 
pragmatic effects are required for the emergence of a truth-evaluable entity even 
if the sentence does not contain any obvious context-sensitive expressions. They 
further claim that these effects cannot be confined to a specific class of expressions. 
The role of the semantical level of a framework is understood as that of a potential-
ity. For expressions are not considered to be meaningful independently of a speech 
act (Recanati 2004: 152). In any case, the boundary between semantics and prag-
matics seems to be blurred. But in all three positions outlined above there is agree-
ment that pragmatic effects determine to at least some degree the truth conditions 
of an utterance. In contrast to them, Bach insists that “semantics and pragmatics 
have distinct subject matters, sentences and utterances, respectively” (Bach 2004: 
28). He maintains that we are able to draw a clear-cut line between these areas. For 
him “semantic properties are on a par with syntactic and phonological properties: 
they are linguistic properties. Pragmatic properties, on the other hand, belong to 
acts of uttering sentences in the course of communicating” (Bach 2004: 24). I quote 
some further philosophers and linguists to show that Bach is not alone in this view:
The fact that a word or phrase has a certain meaning clearly belongs to semantics. On the 
other hand, a claim about the basis for ascribing a certain meaning to a word or phrase does 
not belong to semantics. (Almog/Wettstein/Kaplan 1989: 573)
[…] traditionally, […] semantics [is] to be the study of meaning, […] pragmatics is the study 
of language usage. (Levinson 1983: 5)
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A strong pragmatic effect on what is communicated is one in which context affects what 
is communicated, but not by affecting the referential contents of any lexical item in a sen-
tence. (Stanley/King 2005: 140)
If one understands the distinction as clear-cut as stated explicitly by Bach, one 
might wonder why semantics and pragmatics are mentioned in the same breath 
at all. Put differently, if despite their “distinct subject matters” (Bach 2004: 28) 
both semantics and pragmatics belong somehow together, the assumed substan-
tial relation between them needs to be accounted for. Or, if one admits that the 
distinction is as explicit and as clear-cut as suggested by Bach and also thinks 
that there is no substantial relation between semantics and pragmatics, then, 
admittedly, one does not need to provide an account of the relationship between 
these fields, i.e. the unity of the utterance. But then the motives for the debate 
about the distinction become even less comprehensible. For on Bach’s model, 
why should we understand pragmatics as being part of linguistics at all?
In contrast to the philosophers and linguists I have just quoted, I hold that 
to account for the distinction between semantics and pragmatics requires one to 
understand these aspects as being mutually dependent. Intuitively, if one main-
tains that there is a distinction, one should be able to account for each of the 
aspects independently of the others. However, this seems to be deeply problem-
atic as near-pragmatic effects show. So what I claim is that the identification of 
semantic properties is dependent on appealing to pragmatic aspects – and vice 
versa. Consequently, it is a mistake to study semantic or pragmatic elements and 
effects in isolation. This can be shown by the inability of advocates of such a 
distinction to meet the requirement I call the independency condition: the appeal 
to semantic or pragmatic properties has to make sense independently of other 
factors or levels of a framework built to explain the interpretation of an utterance. 
That this is the aim of proponents of a semantic-pragmatic distinction is shown 
by the above mentioned quotes where the possibility of the study of semantic and 
pragmatic entities and effects is assumed. However, as I argue in the remainder 
of this paper, the independent study of semantic and pragmatic elements and 
effects falls prey to the same problem that has plagued philosophers when it 
comes to account for the unity of the proposition.
3 The problem of the unity
The problem of the unity of the propositions or the unity problem can be traced 
back to Plato and is addressed by philosophers in different areas. Nowadays, 
the problem is understood mostly as pertaining to the philosophy of language. 
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It emerges when we ask how singular terms are related to predicates so that one 
gets a unified sentence or proposition. I rephrase this question in the light of the 
debate on the distinction between semantics and pragmatics: how are elements 
and effects pertaining to either of these realms merged so that one gets a unified 
utterance? In order to demonstrate the pertinence of the unity problem for the 
debates on a distinction between semantics and pragmatics, I refer to Russell’s 
analysis of a proposition. I then show how, mutatis mutandis, the same problem 
besets the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. 
In dealing with the nature of the special unity of a proposition, Russell writes 
in the Principles of Mathematics:
Consider, for example, the proposition “A differs from B”. The constituents of this proposi-
tion, if we analyse it, appear to be only A, difference, B. Yet these constituents, thus placed 
side by side, do not reconstitute the proposition. The difference which occurs in the propo-
sition actually relates A and B, whereas the difference after analysis is a notion which has 
no connection with A and B. It may be said that we ought, in the analysis, to mention the 
relations which difference has to A and B, relations which are expressed by is and from 
when we say “A is different from B”. These relations consist in the fact that A is referent and 
B relatum with respect to difference. But “A, referent, difference, relatum, B” is still merely a 
list of terms, not a proposition. A proposition, in fact, is essentially a unity, and when analy-
sis has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition. The 
verb, when used as a verb, embodies the unity of the proposition, and is thus distinguish-
able from the verb considered as a term, though I do not know how to give a clear account 
of the precise nature of the distinction. (Russell [1903] 2010: §54)
As Russell writes, under analysis a proposition loses its unity. Part of the analysis 
of a proposition is that we decompose it into its constituents. What, then, needs to 
be accounted for is the unity a proposition exhibits. One should not be puzzled by 
Russell’s realist view of propositions and what their constituents are, for at least 
in this context it is secondary what one takes to be the primary unit of meaning – 
Russellian propositions, sentences, utterances etc. Regardless which of them is 
considered to be the primary unit of interpretation, when analysing it, i.e. decom-
posing it into its constituents, one “destroys” its unity: one gets a mere list of 
constituents. However, an utterance or a proposition differs fundamentally from 
such a list. In contrast to a list, an utterance as the primary bearer of meaning can 
be, most strikingly, either true or false, or, appropriate or inappropriate. Only in 
virtue of a unity these predicates can be ascribed to an utterance.7
7 For contemporary contributions and the different presentations of the problem, see Davidson 
(2005), Gaskin (2008), contributions to Riegelnik (2010).
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If – as Russell anticipates – one tries to achieve the restoration of the unity by 
appeal to a relation, perhaps referred to by the copula, one will be disappointed. 
The so introduced relation is but a further element on the list of unjoined parts 
and there is still no unity between them in sight which could be true or false, 
appropriate or inappropriate. Further, for reasons of consistency, another rela-
tion needs to be introduced which is supposed to unite the original list of com-
ponents with the initially introduced relation. But again, this relation is just a 
further item on the list of unjoined parts. And so forth, ad infinitum. This shows 
that the appeal to relations in order to restore the unity is a hopeless endeavour, 
for it ends in an inescapable infinite regress. It is not the nature of a relation that 
causes the regress – whatever entity or means one introduces as a form of “glue” 
in order to combine the components, one ends up in the regress just sketched.8
Russell discusses the problem of the unity of the proposition in the light of 
the debate on the semantic role of verbs or predicates: for him a theory of predica-
tion is supposed to explain the unity. He does not have the distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics in mind. However, the same problem emerges when 
we attempt to account for the relationship between semantic and pragmatic enti-
ties and effects.
An utterance, taken as the primary unit of meaning or interpretation, is con-
sidered to comprise all elements and effects relevant for its constitution. An advo-
cate of a distinction between the semantics and the pragmatics of an utterance 
might analyse the “This-is-Ginger”-utterance as follows: it consists, on the one 
hand, of the expressions used and, on the other hand, the part which is con-
veyed by pointing towards Ginger, and perhaps also further factors which need 
not concern us here. The choice of words and the way these words are uttered 
determine ideally in a decisive way the interpretation of the utterance. Counter-
factually, the interpretation of the utterance would differ, if the speaker acted in a 
different way or if she used different words. Imagine if the speaker is sipping her 
wine, one can assume “ginger” in “This is ginger” refers to a spice. Conversely, 
she may say “This woman in the corner with the nice coat is Ginger” and, clearly, 
“this” refers to the woman named Ginger. But in virtue of what do the expressions 
and the gesture form a unity? As Russell’s analysis of a proposition shows, as 
soon as one needs to account for a combination of these parts, be it thought as the 
combination of the context-independent part with the context-dependent one, or 
the gesture and the words, the analysis is threatened by an infinite regress. For 
8 Showing how prominent accounts fall into this trap is Davidson’s leitmotif in Truth and 
 Predication (2005).
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then one would need a further entity which unites the unifying entity with the 
original parts. So we are left with distinct entities.
4  Truth-conditional semantics and the unity of 
the sentence
In contrast to contemporary truth conditional theories of meaning such as mini-
malism, moderate contextualism or radical contextualism, in Davidson’s account 
of the semantics of a declarative sentence one does not find a distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics. One could even sum up Davidson’s approach by 
emphasizing that any independent specification of truth conditions, or the sup-
posed to be semantic meaning as independent from pragmatics, or the meaning of 
a predicate expression as independent from the meaning of the utterance etc. is 
utterly mistaken. For, by Davidson’s lights, such a distinction makes it impossible 
to understand how expressions are used as part of a sentence in such a way that 
one understands what somebody says (Davidson 1967: 17, 2005).
Whether or not one holds Davidson’s approach towards a unified theory of 
meaning viable, it serves as a point of reference for the question of the unity of 
semantics and pragmatics. In Truth and Predication (2005) Davidson follows 
Russell in discussing the problem of the unity of a proposition in connection with 
the problem of predication. Davidson argues that the semantic role of a predicate 
cannot be explained unless we examine it in the context of a whole sentence. His 
solution to the unity problem is part of his comprehensive theory of meaning in 
which the principle of compositionality plays a key role. According to this principle, 
the meaning of complex meaningful expressions, i.e. sentences, is considered to be 
determined of the meaning of simpler expressions. The question now is: what con-
cepts should one appeal to if one wants to explain the contribution of the parts of a 
sentence? In the case of a subject – usually a singular term – the concept philoso-
phers appeal to is reference or denotation. But what concept one should appeal to 
if one wants to explain the contribution of the predicate? In order to determine the 
predicate’s contribution to the truth conditions, Davidson appeals to the concept of 
satisfaction: it pairs objects with so-called open sentences, which are expressions 
with free variables. An object satisfies an open sentence if the resulting sentence is 
true. Hence snow satisfies “x is white”, for “snow is white” is true and grass does 
not satisfy “x is white” for it is not the case that grass is white. The approach just 
sketched emerges from Davidson’s engagement with accounts that could not prop-
erly explain the unity of the utterance. Pursuant to this, Davidson’s own account 
is not subject to these deficiencies (cf. Davidson 2005: chapter 7). Most essentially, 
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it does not generate an infinite regress and it links predicates as essential parts of 
sentences to the sentences’ truth conditions. “In a minimal but important respect”, 
Davidson states, “a theory of truth for a language does […] what we want, that is, 
give the meaning of all independently meaningful expressions on the basis of an 
analysis of their structure” (Davidson 1970: 55). The structure, as I have already 
pointed out, must not be understood as being independent of the utterance or as an 
additional part in the way Russell had thought of it in his multiple relation theory.
In Davidson one does not find a distinction between semantics and pragmatics, 
or, generally speaking, the idea of different levels. Nor does one find a distinction 
between sentences and propositions, the latter expressed by the former relative to 
different contexts, influenced and shaped by pragmatic effects. This, of course, 
does not mean that Davidson denies that factors usually grouped under the label 
pragmatics are relevant for the interpretation of an utterance. It is rather the idea 
of a “framework with different levels” (see section 2) that stands in opposition to his 
idea of a sound theory of interpretation. Also, interestingly, many contextualists 
who advocate a distinction between semantics and pragmatics see themselves as 
being in opposition to Davidson – as stated explicitly by Bezuidenhout – “[i]f one 
embraces the contextualist perspective one must give up traditional Davidsonian 
style semantic theories” (Bezuidenhout 2002: 105) – then because their emphasis 
on the significance of pragmatics is a view which would be for Davidson a version 
of reductionism. This is so because according to Davidson, contextualists try to 
save a distinction between semantics and pragmatics by negating one part of the 
assumed relation. In Davidson’s model, ironically, defenders of the distinction end 
up trying to reduce one part of the distinction to the other.
5  Near-side pragmatic effects and the unity of 
semantics and pragmatics
As I have already pointed out, in recent years debates on the semantics- 
pragmatics distinction have centred on the question of the degree of the impact 
of pragmatic effects or contextual contributions on the truth conditions of an 
utterance. This has led to considerations about the interplay between semantics 
and pragmatics given that it is assumed that a sentence might express different 
propositions relative to different contexts.9 The thesis I am going to scrutinize is 
9 An argument along similar lines can be formulated for theories understanding the process of 
interpretation in two or more phases – for what unites the phases?
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that near-side pragmatic effects explain the divergence of sentence meaning and 
propositions expressed by sentences. In contrast to far-side pragmatic effects, 
near-side pragmatic effects are considered to be relevant for the determination of 
what is said (Grice 1989: 25) with the utterance of a sentence. This class of prag-
matic effects – mostly contextual factors – comes into play when the knowledge 
of the sentence meaning is considered to be insufficient for the interpretation of 
an utterance.10 Since what is said with an utterance is usually associated with 
the truth-conditional meaning of an utterance, the governing assumption is that 
near-side pragmatic effects influence the determination of truth conditions of an 
utterance. Further it is assumed that these effects complement or modify the sen-
tence meaning of the expressions or the semantic potentials used so that a truth- 
evaluable entity – usually a proposition – results. Put this way, a proposition 
would be the result of a sentence enriched by near-side pragmatic effects. Intui-
tively, this seems to be correct, for one and the same sentence can be used to 
express different propositions. Again, the sentence “This is Ginger” uttered on dif-
ferent occasions can express different propositions, depending on the gesture, or 
more precisely, the person or the object “this” refers to. This requires that expres-
sions composing a sentence have to be receptive to pragmatic effects: “this” must 
be understood as an expression being able to make varying contributions to the 
proposition expressed. If this were not the case, the proposition would be deter-
mined exclusively by the expressions used. Consequently, there would be no room 
for near-side pragmatic effects to determine or shape the proposition expressed 
by an utterance. However, the traditional way to cope with indexical expressions 
and demonstratives has on closer examination serious shortcomings.
My main objection is that such an approach faces the same dilemma which 
I stated implicitly before: either near-side pragmatic effects are tied to what is 
considered to be the semantic level of an utterance in a way that there is no dis-
tinction between semantics and pragmatics, or, there is a distinction, but the 
grounds for understanding this interplay remain opaque.
According to the first horn of the dilemma – near-side pragmatic effects must 
be tied to the semantic level, otherwise there is no mutual influence. And if there 
is no mutual influence, one can hardly speak of near-side pragmatic effects, for 
these effects are introduced precisely to influence the semantics of an utterance. 
For the sake of the argument, near-side pragmatic effects affect truth conditions via 
the expressions composing the sentence. They enrich or modulate the word mean-
ings of the expressions composing the sentence. This entails that the expressions 
used have to be understood as incomplete. For if they were complete, near-side 
10 This holds also for implicatures.
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pragmatic effects could not perform their function and enrich or modulate the word 
meanings. In other words, the incomplete part of the expression remains constant 
and gets completed or enriched from utterance to utterance or from context to 
context. This puts the semantic part of an utterance on a par with what Recanati 
calls “semantic potentials” (Recanati 2004: 152). Semantic potentials are taken to be 
the most basic unit. Above them, it is assumed that pragmatic effects are added at 
this higher level to supplement the semantics. Finally, the unity of these two levels 
is reflected by the utterance itself. However, this approach simply shifts the problem 
to the lower level. On the lower level, the same basic problem emerges. To wit, one 
still needs to account for how indexical expressions and demonstratives are open 
to pragmatic effects. In order to illustrate the point further, I return to Recanati’s 
notion of semantic potentials – assuming that the level of semantic potentials does 
contribute to the higher level. But for this, a third factor is required relative to which 
varying contributions are made by one and the same semantic potential. The third 
factor could be thought again as near-side pragmatic effects – except that in this 
case they are supposed to be decisive for the contribution a semantic potential 
actually makes to the determination of the expressions which determine the next 
level, i.e. the proposition. Further if one now considers the semantic potential as 
part of the framework, i.e. as a level of the framework, one encounters the same 
problem again: one part of the semantic potential remains constant across different 
utterances and one part makes varying contributions. But where should one now 
tie the near-side pragmatic effects relative to which a contribution to the expression 
is made? Again we might introduce one further level, a potential of the semantic 
potential, and so on, ad infinitum. One gets again caught in an infinite regress. 
In summation, I conclude that either we assume that the meaning of an expres-
sion as a contribution to the meaning of the utterance is complete or we end up 
in the regress I have just emphasized. This conclusion seems to be fatal for those 
who argue that truth conditions vary with contexts: near-side pragmatic effects, 
or contextual contributions, cannot “latch onto” the invariant part, or whatever is 
thought to constitute the semantic or lower level of a framework.11
11 What thereby is shown, too, is that drawing a distinction between semantics and pragmatics 
requires that the semantic level has to be regarded as significant independently from pragmatics. 
This is not so if pragmatic effects overrule qua pragmatic effects the contributions of the seman-
tic level. By way of an example, even if one admits that it is possible that the sentence “The lion 
sleeps tonight” can be used to express the proposition that the woman in the corner is Ginger, for 
instance by way of an implicature, it cannot be a general principle. For if the role of the semantics 
is displaced, there is no relatum which corresponds to semantics as the counterpart of pragmat-
ics. In other words, semantics and pragmatics collapse.
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At the beginning of this section, I formulated a dilemma: either near-side 
pragmatic effects are tied to what represents the semantic level or the distinction 
represents an ill-founded postulation. As it is with dilemmas, the second horn 
shares with the first one its problems. If it is assumed that near-side pragmatic 
effects can be specified independently of any other level of a framework, then 
their contribution to the semantic level cannot be accounted for. In general, this 
means that once one of the levels involved in a framework based on a distinc-
tion between semantics and pragmatics is taken to be irrelevant, one should not 
assume a distinction anymore. As a consequence, it does not make sense to speak 
of a relation between semantics and pragmatics in such a way that it makes sense 
to identify the fields in question independently of each other. But then it seems 
that the idea of a theory of interpretation based on such a distinction makes no 
sense.
6 Conclusion
Proponents of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics maintain that 
we can appeal to either aspect without any need to invoke the other. Indeed, this 
is exactly how one can disentangle pragmatic and semantic effects. This com-
mitment to what I call the independency condition gives rise to a special version 
of the problem of the unity of an utterance. In comparing theories which draw 
a distinction between different levels with Davidson’s theory of interpretation, 
I have emphasized that the former cannot account for the unity. I further believe 
that this failure indicates the unintelligibility of understanding a sentence as 
distinct from the way we communicate. The idea that part of an utterance – a 
sentence as representative for semantics – remains constant and another part – 
the effects on the sentence – varies has proven to be unsuccessful. For either the 
varying factors are tied to the sentence’s level, so there is no essential distinction 
between semantics and pragmatics. Or, there is a distinction, but the grounds for 
being effective are opaque.
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